There is little understanding of why the discussion of alleged famine in Gaza has become hysterical in recent weeks. That is despite the fact that the answer is hiding in plain sight.

The answer most people would give is probably that the threat of famine has become more urgent. But that ignores the fact that the spectre of imminent catastrophic famine has been raised frequently by the United Nations (UN) since the beginning of the war. The question is why the discussion has recently become so frenzied.

And anyone who denies the discussion has a hysterical character should note the claim by Tom Fletcher, the UN under-secretary of humanitarian affairs, who said on 20 May that 14,000 babies would die in the next 48 hours if Israel did not end its blockade. As was entirely predictable the deaths failed to materialise. But the hysteria was not confined to Fletcher himself. The BBC interviewer conspicuously failed in her basic journalistic duty to ask Fletcher on what basis the figure was calculated.

None of this is meant to deny that the plight of ordinary Gazans is desperate. No doubt life as a Gazan civilian has been horrendous since the start of the war. But for the whole time the claim of imminent starvation has been consistently overdone. 

An alternative explanation, although still limited, is that the shifting attitudes reflect the battle raging between Israel and Hamas for control of the Gaza strip. Whoever controls the food supply has a strong influence on those who live there. Hamas has consistently used its control of aid delivery – working closely with the UN – to obtain food for its own fighters and raise funds for the organisation. It does the latter by selling over-priced food to civilians at inflated prices. 

Such activity confirms that Hamas has no regard for Gaza’s civilians. On the contrary, their suffering is regarded as positive as it can be harnessed to its propaganda campaign against Israel. Indeed Hamas leaders have in the past welcomed the death of Palestinian civilians which could work to its advantage.

The challenge Hamas now faces is that Israel and America are backing an alternative distribution system via the recently established Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. Its goal is to bypass the current channels, essentially run by the UN and Hamas, to get aid to Gazans. As a result it poses a threat to Hamas’s financial integrity and is an outrage to its supporters. 

In this context it is notable that several large western nations have come out against Israel expanding its operations in Gaza. Britain, Canada and France made a joint statement to this effect. Perhaps even more notably the German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, said Israel’s war against Hamas can no longer be justified. Since Germany is generally wary of being openly critical of Israel this marked an important shift. All these countries, despite lip service to Israel’s right to defend itself, would rather see Hamas left intact.

However, the battle for control, including the conflict over aid distribution, does not sufficiently explain why the situation has come to a head recently. Why not, say, six months ago? Or 12 months ago?

To understand the shift it is necessary to examine how Israel’s strategy in Gaza changed fundamentally last month. Although it is not possible to be certain about every detail – some things are covert and there is much disinformation around – the explanation becomes apparent if Israel’s changing military strategy is examined.

In broad terms it is necessary to divide Israel’s military intervention into Gaza into three phases. First, there was its lack of preparedness in the immediate aftermath of the 7 October pogrom. Second, the raid and retreat phase which lasted until last month. Finally, since May, it has shifted to what is called a clear-hold-build (CHB) military strategy in what Israel’s military has designated Operation Gideon’s Chariots. To properly understand recent developments in Gaza it is particularly important to grasp the shift from the second to the third phase. However, it is necessary to start at the beginning of the war.

Lack of preparedness

There is no doubt that the 7 October pogrom itself showed the IDF in disarray. Israeli sources themselves accept that. As early as 7 October itself a report for Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) talked of “colossal intelligence and operational failures”. There were many acts of individual bravery by Israelis but, in retrospect, Israel was not well-prepared for such a large-scale coordinated assault by Hamas.

Less well understood than the immediate disarray is Israel’s lack of an operational plan to invade the Gaza strip. Well-prepared militaries are typically meant to have contingency plans for such eventualities. In the event it took 20 days from the start of the pogrom to the launch of Israel’s full-scale ground offensive on Gaza. Israel had relatively little readiness and insufficient preparation at the beginning.

There were reasons for this lack of preparedness. One was that Israel – rightly as it happened – saw Hizbullah in Lebanon as a more powerful military force than Hamas. Israeli military planners saw a concerted attack from the north by Hizbullah, an organisation also committed to Israel’s destruction, as a greater threat than Hamas in the south. In the event – thankfully for Israel – Hizbullah hesitated before mounting an attack giving Israel time to send reinforcements in the north. The deadly incursion came from the south instead.

Limited raids strategy

This recent discussion of Israel taking military control over the whole of the Gaza strip may come as a surprise to some. It would be excusable to assume Israel had already done that in the early stages of the current war. The key to understanding Israel’s strategy for most of its incursion is the “raid and retreat” nature of its approach.

In an article published in Mosaic magazine in January 2025 a lecturer in military history and strategy at the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) war colleges, Ron Baratz, made the astonishing point that: “Fifteen months into the war, 30 percent of the Gaza Strip—a small territory of merely 140 square miles—has never been entered by the IDF. An additional 40 percent remains free of an IDF presence, because Israeli forces continue a cycle of raiding and withdrawing. Although its military capabilities have been diminished and part of its leadership eliminated, Hamas still retains control over most of Gaza and over its entire population.” So, despite what seemed like a full-scale invasion, Israeli ground forces only controlled a small proportion of the strip.

Although destroying Hamas was one of Israel’s frequently stated key war goals it pursued a strategy that could not achieve this objective. It was essentially containing Hamas rather than trying to eliminate it. IDF action stopped Hamas conducting large-scale military operations but it remained intact as a guerrilla force. Some 75% of the terror group’s vast tunnel network remained intact so it retains substantial capacity to hide its fighters under the civilian population. Naturally it does not allow civilians to shelter in its tunnels.

As long as Hamas continues to exist in embryonic form it has the capacity to rebuild itself. In this context it should be remembered that its leaders have said many times that they would like to repeat the 7 October pogrom. This is in line with their founding goals of wanting to destroy Israel and slaughter its citizens. 

Many put Israel’s failure to destroy Hamas down to the Biden administration. They argued, with considerable justification, that Biden wanted Hamas weakened but not eliminated. America under the last president saw Hamas as a potential partner in a future peace agreement.

But international pressure was only part of the reason for Israel’s limited intervention. Baratz argues convincingly that what he called Israel’s ‘postmodern military’ was another restraint on action. The IDF had absorbed many of the questionable military assumptions which found favour in the West following the end of the Cold War: “conventional wars were over; the only threats that remained were missiles and terror; technology would overcome all possible threats; and concepts such as strategic depth and maneuvering divisions are obsolete.”  In Israel it was Shimon Peres, a former prime minister, who played a central role in promoting this outlook. The result of accepting this view was a tragic lack of preparedness for a full-scale war with its enemies.

Shifting strategy

By early this year it was becoming apparent that Israel could switch its military strategy in Gaza. It was increasingly openly stated that Israel was not achieving its war goals. As an INSS briefing in February noted: “After 500 days of fighting, Israel has not defeated the terrorist organization Hamas.” The new military strategy is a belated recognition of this harsh reality.

It was also enabled by a shift in political and military leadership. Israel Katz took over as defence minister in December 2024 and Eyal Zamir became the new chief of staff in March. In both cases their predecessors were opposed to being drawn in to taking full control of the strip. The advent of the Trump administration in January also gave Israel more flexibility to act.

By February there was open talk of Israel resuming a full-scale war in the strip. Zamir was already planning this new strategy even before taking office.

In the subsequent weeks it became clear that Israel was planning to implement a clear-hold-build (CHB) strategy. This is a counter-insurgency approach devised by the American military to be used in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. It is also sometimes used by police forces to deal with criminal gangs. The essence of it is to hold on to territory so it is then possible to build new structure and institutions. That is in contrast to the raid and retreat strategy which involves holding on to limited territory.

Opinions differ over whether the approach is a good one for Israel. Even military experts who have taken a consistently pro-Israel position disagree on this question. John Spencer, the chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the West Point military academy, was fairly upbeat about the strategy while acknowledging the challenges are immense. These include what happens on the battlefield and what happens in the political realm.

In contrast, Andrew Fox, a Middle East specialist and former paratrooper officer, argued that CHB is “a terrible idea” in this context. He gives several reasons for this scepticism including the fact that conventional military forces are not trained or equipped for policing or civil administration. He is also sceptical that the IDF will have sufficient legitimacy among the local population.

In any event on 5 May the IDF started to implement its CHB strategy  under the name of Gideon’s Chariots. A key goal is to capture about 75% of the strip from the previous level of 40%, within two months. Related to that it involves moving the civilian population into the remaining 25% of the area and developing the alternative aid distribution channels. If this strategy goes as hoped the final stage will be the destruction of Hamas.

In parallel with the military campaign Israel is seeking to intensify the financial crisis which Hamas seems to be suffering. As early as April there were reports   that Hamas was running so low on cash it was unable to pay its fighters. 

The shift in Israel’s military doctrine seems to be real backdrop to the current hysteria over Gaza. For Israel it looks like it could be a final attempt to completely eliminate the Hamas infrastructure. The flip side of this is that Hamas is desperate to ensure its survival against a concerted attempt to destroy its apparatus. 

Meanwhile, the West and many international institutions look like they would much rather Hamas survive than let Israel destroy it. In their perverse view the Islamist terrorist organisation is better seen as a potential partner for peace rather than a truly genocidal organisation.

PHOTO: IDF Spokesperson's Unit / CC BY-SA 3.0