The promotion of a Muslim identity by western elites has made it even harder to distinguish between Islam and Islamism. But that does not mean a contrast should not be made. On the contrary, it is more important than ever to make such distinctions.
Before examining the interaction between Islamism and what I will call Muslim identitarianism I should emphasise two key points. These are necessary in my view to understand the dynamics of the current situation.
First, to assess my argument it is necessary to recognise my claim is that Islamism is best seen as reactionary politics rather than religious extremism. The confusion largely comes because it is often framed in religious language and controls Islamic institutions. It does not help that others use the term “Islamism” to mean extreme Islam or use alternative terms such as fundamentalism or radical Islam. However, the dynamic behind Islamism is political as it is driven by particular circumstances rather than classical Islamic doctrines.
Second, the reference here to Muslim identitarianism in the West is not primarily to the membership of a religious community. It is to a kind of transnational Muslim cultural identity which tends to go along with little or no attachment to a particular nation state. For example, Muslims in Britain who take on this identity typically identify as culturally Muslim while having little or no affinity to their home state. Indeed they may feel deeply hostile to the state in which they live. Typically they will also feel animosity to Israel as symbolic of all that is evil in the West.
Islamism as a political movement
When people hear the term “Islamism” they normally file it mentally together with Christianity, Hinduism and Judaism. They do not necessarily assume it has a comparable set of beliefs but they see it as an extreme form of the religion of Islam. That is emphatically not what I am arguing.
My claim is that Islamism should be filed mentally as a political ideology along with conservatism and liberalism. That does not mean its beliefs are similar to conservatism or liberalism but that it is essentially a form of politics rather than religion.
In chronological terms it developed parallel to fascism and Stalinism – the outlook of the old Soviet Union. The end of the first world war saw the 1917 Russian revolution and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman and Russian empires. The global political order fundamentally changed.
As I have previously argued Islamism first emerged as a political ideology against the immediate backdrop of the collapse of the Ottoman empire. At that point Britain and France carved up the region formerly controlled by the Islamic caliphate based in what is now Turkey. The first Islamist movement was the Muslim Brotherhood established in Egypt in 1928.
In 1941 the first Islamist movement in South Asia, Jamaat-e-Islami, was formed. This was against a backdrop of resistance to British colonial control over the Indian sub-continent.
But Islamism was only one of several reactions to the growing colonial domination of these territories. The predominant reaction was that of a modernising nationalism. The elites in these countries were anti-colonial in that they wanted to take control of these territories themselves.
Islamism was a reaction both to colonial domination but also to rising nationalism. For example, in both Egypt and what became Pakistan there were nationalist movements the Islamists were reacting against.
Islamism was a profoundly anti-modern reaction. It was not against technological development but it did oppose western concepts such as sovereignty, rights and democracy. It was also cynical towards and in some cases opposed to nation-states. Its ultimate goal was typically the creation of an international Islamic order.
Islamism is therefore an entirely reactionary political outlook. It includes its own key thinkers, such as Sayyid Qutb in Egypt and Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi in South Asia. It also has a range of political networks including those of transnational movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood (centred on the Arab world) and Jamaat-e-Islami (centered on South Asia). It also includes those more closely linked to existing nation-states, such as the AKP in Turkey, but typically these claim to also represent populations beyond their own borders.
Often Islamist groups work through front organisations, such as student organisations and anti-Israel groups which can be hard to spot because they operate covertly. For this reason it is also hard to accurately estimate the number of Islamists in the world. Ed Husain, an expert on the subject, gives a rough estimate of five million members worldwide for the Muslim Brotherhood alone. But this is not backed by any survey data. It is difficult to get an authoritative figure precisely because Islamists often operate covertly.
To add to the confusion they often use the language of Islam. They quote from ancient Islamic texts and claim to represent the authentic voice of Islam. Islamists often aggressively intimidate non-Islamist Muslims who seek to promote an alternative view of Islam. Islamist movements also often seek to take control of Muslim communal institutions so they can appear to speak on behalf of all Muslims.
So, just to recap, Islamism is best seen as a reactionary political movement rather than a form of religious extremism. However, it operates, often covertly, within the global Muslim world and often uses the language of Islam.
Muslims and identity politics
In recent decades identity politics has come to the fore in the West. The main social division is no longer seen as social class. At the same time the old liberal idea that communal or ethnic differences can be transcended has fallen out of favour. Instead the West is seen as characterised by irreconcilable shared group identities. They should be recognised but, in this view, they cannot be overcome.
Alongside comes the view that there is a hierarchy of oppression. In this flawed view white people are generally seen as at the top of the pyramid with Jews cast as “hyper-white” at the pinnacle. In contrast, people of colour are generally cast as intrinsically oppressed.
Muslims come into the picture because those who uphold identity politics typically argue they are at the bottom of the hierarchy. From an identitarian perspective it then becomes necessary to promote equity by favouring Muslims. In this view they should be granted preferences to make up for the gross historical injustice of colonialism.
This underlying assumption helps explain the many preferences granted to Muslims by the authorities in the West. Most notably anyone who disrespects Islam as a religion or speaks ill of Muslims faces being accused of Islamophobia. In practice this is becoming akin to a blasphemy. Ironically criticism of Christianity is widely seen as acceptable whereas speaking ill of Islam is not.
This operates against a backdrop in which identity politics, often in the form of a state-backed multiculturalism, influences the population as a whole. While loyalty to the nation-state is discouraged and identification with specific communities is often encouraged.
For Muslims this creates an environment in which they often identity more with their communities than with their nation. They also often internalise the assumption that they deserve privileged treatment to make up for past wrongs.
Interaction
Islamism and Muslim identitarianism co-exist and interact with each other in western societies but that does not mean they are the same thing. One is a form of politics and the other a type of communal identity. Making the distinctions in practice can be difficult, particularly since Islamists tend to work through covert channels, but that does not mean they do not exist.
Islamist networks operate, to a greater or lesser extent, in contemporary western societies. Often different networks are tied to communities with different national or regional origins such as Arab, Iranian, Pakistani or Turkish. There is not one Islamist political networks but many.
Muslim identitarianism and Islamism can certainly interact with each other. Those who identify as Muslim, as opposed to identifying with the nation-state where they live, are more likely to find Islamist groups appealing. No doubt there are a significant number who have such an identitarian association and are supporters of Islamist groups.
These are often strongly attached to particular communities but sometimes they are not. For example, it is possible to not identify with any particular Muslim community but come to Islamism through involvement in anti-Israel activism. The “Palestine solidarity” movement provides a hospitable environment where Islamists from any background can operate.
The importance of distinctions
Despite the affinity they have with each other it is important not to collapse the categories. It is possible to be a Muslim identitarian or an Islamist or both. It is possible to be a Muslim identitarian without being a supporter of an Islamist group. Or a supporter of Islamism without buying into identitarianism.
Islam also continues to exist as a religion. It is possible to be believe in the faith without buying into Islamism or identitarianism. There are about two billion Muslims in the world so there is plenty of room for divisions and sub-divisions within the grouping.
It would also be a mistake to assume that it is itself fixed. Like all religions it changes over time. The Islam of the 7th century, when the religion was founded, is no doubt fundamentally different from Islam in the 21st century.
Upholding these distinctions is important for at least three reasons.
First, because they are true. The Muslim world is complex. It should not be reduced to one essential set of ideas which is unchanged over time. Such an approach is fundamentally ahistorical.
Second, because they have explanatory power. The distinction between Islamism and Islam helps to better understand contemporary politics. The existence of Islamism has in turn pushed much of the Muslim world in a more reactionary direction. Once Islamism is understood as a reactionary political movement its ties with the western left also make more sense. They share so much in common as political movements: opposition to modernity, hostility to democracy, deep cynicism towards the nation state and so on.
Finally, painting the entire Muslim world as flawed, or at least potentially flawed, can open the way to anti-Muslim bigotry. All Muslims can be painted as essentially backward. Such an approach also ignores relatively liberal movements within the Muslim world such as Islamic modernism (historically), Sufis and Ismailis. That is not to say such movements are perfect but their existence shows the Muslim world is more diverse than often assumed.
It is often tempting to see the social world in black and white. In this case painting all Muslims as malevolent or at least potentially evil. This is a dangerous view which should be staunchly resisted.
Further reading
Why Islamism and progressives have so much in common
PHOTO: Stage, Eid Festival, Trafalgar Square by Robin Webster, CC BY-SA 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons